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This paper presents a new rationale for imposing restrictions on child labor.
In a standard overlapping generations model where parental altruism results in
transfers that children allocate to consumption and education, the Nash-Cournot equi-
librium results in sub-optimal levels of parental transfers and does not maximize the
average level of utility of currently living agents. A ban on child labor decreases chil-
dren￿ s income and generates an increase in parental transfers bringing their levels closer
to the optimum, raising children￿ s welfare as well as average welfare in the short-run
and in the long-run.
Moreover, the inability to work allows children to allocate more time to education,
and it leads to an increase in human capital. Besides, to increase transfers, parents
decrease savings and, hence, physical capital accumulation. When prices are ￿ exible,
these e⁄ects diminish the positive welfare impact of the ban on child labor.
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11 Introduction
The issue of child labor has recently been the subject of a surge in formal economic analysis.
According to ILO (2006) there has been a signi￿cant decrease in child labor and an even
steeper decline in hazardous child labor; nevertheless in 2004 there were still 218 million child
laborers, of whom 126 million were in hazardous work. The increase in research around this
topic is in part the result of the growing awareness of the persistence of child labor around
the world and the importance of developing theoretical models that help us understand the
incidence of child labor and its implications, as only then can we recommend and implement
e⁄ective policy interventions.
The economics literature is ambiguous on the desirability of a ban on child labor. Child
labor is typically viewed as the result of some deeper problem in the economy, and addressing
child labor without solving the problem that leads to its occurrence can make children worse
o⁄. For example, Dessy and Pallage (2005) present an environment where, although child
labor has a negative direct impact on children￿ s well-being, it is the best available choice for
children. Hence, a ban on child labor, even on its worst forms, deprives children of their best
possible choice and can make children worse o⁄.
Standard arguments for the imposition of restrictions on child labor are based on the
existence of externalities, such as positive externalities from a well-educated population (see
Udry, 2006). A ban on child labor leads children to allocate more resources to education,
brings the average levels of human capital closer to the optimal, and consequently increases
welfare. Constraining the amount of labor supplied by children is also often suggested as an
instrument to move the economy towards a desired equilibrium in environments where multi-
ple equilibria can emerge, as in Dessy and Pallage (2001) and Basu and Van (1998). Banning
child labor can also be an instrument to achieve increases in e¢ ciency in the presence of cap-
ital market imperfections. In Baland and Robinson (2000), capital market imperfections do
not allow altruistic parents to internalize the negative impact of child labor on children￿ s
human capital accumulation. A restriction on the amount of time allocated to work by
2children is suggested to reduce the resulting ine¢ ciently high levels of child labor. Finally,
Rogers and Swinnerton (2002) advance parents￿incomplete information on the type of work,
safe or hazardous, their children perform as an argument for a ban on the worst forms of
child labor.1
In this paper, I show that, in a standard overlapping generations economy with parental
altruism calibrated to the 1880￿ s, a ban on child labor increases parental transfers and raises
children￿ s as well as the average levels of welfare in the short-run and in the long-run.
This result introduces a new rationale for imposing restrictions on child labor adding to a
debate still in its early stages of development.2 In an overlapping generations economy with
altruism, the unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium does not maximize the average welfare
of currently living agents, as was shown in Bernheim (1989), nor the welfare of children
and generates sub-optimal levels of parental transfers. By reducing the income earned by
children, a ban on child labor reduces children￿ s consumption, raising their marginal utility of
consumption, and parents respond by increasing transfers to children. Hence, the ban places
children at a point in their parents￿reaction function that results in a higher level of parental
transfers. By inducing an increase in parental transfers, the ban on child labor moves the
economy closer to the social optimal, generating aggregate welfare gains. Children are made
better o⁄ because they receive more transfers and do not work. Parents are made worse
o⁄ because they need to decrease consumption and leisure to increase parental transfers;
however, the raise in their children￿ s life-time utility partially o⁄-sets this e⁄ect.
Additionally, the inability to work allows children to allocate more time to education,
which raises the return to human capital accumulation. Thus, more of the parental transfers
are allocated to education and the level of skills increases. Future parents￿labor income
increases which bolsters the increase in parental transfers. Consequently, in the long-run,
the rise in parental transfers allows for a more signi￿cant increase in education spending,
1See Basu (1999) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on child labor legislation.
2This paper does not present a theory of the emergence of a ban on child labor which would hinge on the
impact of this policy on the well-being of adult agents, namely the ones with decisive political power.
3human capital, and welfare.
However, to increase parental transfers, agents decrease savings and, hence, physical
capital. When prices are ￿ exible, the increase in human capital and the decrease in physical
capital lower the wage rate and diminish the positive welfare impact of the ban on child
labor.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I use a simple model economy to present
some important analytical results. In Section 3, I present the completely developed economic
environment. In Section 4, the parameters of the economy are calibrated to match long run
features of the US economy. Section 5 presents and analyses the di⁄erent equilibria. Finally,
Section 6 concludes and suggests some directions for future research.
2 Some Preliminary Analytical Results
In this section, I revisit the sub-optimality of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in models with
altruism, and use a simple economic environment to develop a good understanding of the
interaction between child labor, parental transfers and welfare, and to derive analytical
theoretical results.
2.1 Child labor in a static model with altruism
I analyze child labor in a static economy where two types of agents live. Age-1 agent, the
child, derives utility from her own consumption and leisure while age-2 agent, the parent,
derives utility from her own consumption and also from her child￿ s utility. The utility
functions of age-1 and age-2 agents are respectively:
V1 = U(c1;l1); (1)
4and
V2 = U(c2;l2) + ￿a U(c1;l1); (2)
where ci is consumption and li is leisure of agent i. ￿a > 0 is the altruism discount factor, the
factor at which a parent discounts her child￿ s lifetime utility. The utility function, U(:), is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es the Inada
conditions. Additionally, consumption and leisure are assumed to be complements.
Individuals have one unit of time to allocate to work and leisure. They supply hi hours
of labor, earning w hi where w is the real hourly wage rate.
The budget constraints facing each agent are
c1 = wh1 + g2; (3)
c2 = wh2 ￿ g2 (4)
where g2 represents the resources given by a parent to her child.
I assume that both agents are Cournot players. That is, each agent takes as given the
decisions of the other when making her own decisions. As shown in O￿ Connel and Zeldes
(1993), the equilibrium is the same as when we assume that parents are Stackelberg leaders
in the interaction with their children and account for their children￿ s optimal response when
making decisions, and it is also the same as when parents make all decisions in behalf of their
children. The crucial assumption is that children are Cournot players and cannot manipulate
their parent￿ s transfer decision.
52.1.1 Nash-Cournot Equilibrium
Assuming interior solutions, the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to the choices of hi and
g2 are respectively:
Ul(ci;li) = wUc(ci;li); i = 1;2; (5)
Uc(c2;l2) = ￿aUc(c1;l1): (6)
The conditions that determine parent￿ s labor supply (equation 5 for i = 2) and the level of
parental transfers for any given level of the child￿ s decision (equation 6), can be used to derive
a relation between parental transfers and the child￿ s supply of labor: g2 = g(h1): For an utility
function that is increasing and strictly concave in consumption, any factor that generates a
decrease in the child￿ s consumption, increasing her marginal utility of consumption, results
in an increase in transfers. So, parental transfers decrease with the child￿ s labor supply, h1.
2.1.2 Welfare maximization
In this static model with altruism, the transfer from parents to children, g2;t, and the amounts
of work that maximize the social welfare function
SW = V1 + V2 (7)
are such that:
Uc(c1;l1)(1 + ￿a) = Uc(c2;l2) (8)
Ul(ci;li) = wUc(ci;li); 8i; (9)
which imply that, the Nash-Cournot equilibrium does not maximize welfare, as was shown
by Bernheim (1989). The level of parental transfers, g2, that maximizes social welfare is
higher than the one chosen by parents in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium while the welfare
6optimal level of child labor is lower.
The sub-optimality of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium results from the presence of the
positive externality of the child￿ s consumption and leisure on her parent￿ s utility. In the
Nash-Cournot equilibrium the child is not fully compensated for the impact of her decisions
on her parent￿ s utility and enjoys sub-optimal levels of consumption and leisure. For any level
of altruism, a social planner that cares for the lifetime utility of all currently living agents
always gives more weight to the utility of children than do parents. The social planner
cares for the lifetime utility of children directly and through their parent￿ s lifetime utility.
Transfers to children make young agents better o⁄ which raises their own lifetime utility as
well as their parents￿lifetime utility because of altruism. Therefore, a social planner that
weights children￿ s utility positively prefers a level of parental transfers larger than in the
Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
It is also clear that the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem does not hold, at it is
not possible to achieve the optimal allocation of resources in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium
with a reallocation of endowments. Any redistribution of resources across agents would be
exactly o⁄set by a change in transfers from a parent to her child.
2.1.3 Child Labor and Welfare
Soares (2008) shows that, by increasing children￿ s savings and inducing an increase in
parental transfers, the imposition of a borrowing constraint can increase children￿ s welfare as
well as the average level of welfare in the economy. More generally, any factor that generates
a decrease in children￿ s resources leads to an increase in parental transfers, that is it places
children in a point of their parents reaction function that corresponds to a higher level of
parental transfers, bringing them closer to their optimal level. For children that work, it is
immediate to consider that a reduction in the amount of hours of work supplied decreases
their labor income and hence generates the desired response from parents.
Proposition 1: When the economy is in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, a marginal decrease
7in children￿ s labor supply increases children￿ s lifetime utility and the average level of welfare.3
Proof: The social welfare gains of an increase on the child￿ s supply of labor are given by
dSW
dh1




The ￿rst component on the right side of this equation describes the welfare impact of a
change in child labor through the distortion it introduces on the child￿ s supply of labor,
while the second component relates to its impact on the child￿ s utility through the response
it generates in parental transfers.
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The decrease in child labor increases the child￿ s leisure, and reduces her income and hence
her consumption, raising her marginal utility of consumption. The optimal response for the
3While this proposition is similar to proposition 6 in Baland and Robinson (2000), its rationale is di⁄erent.
Moreover, Baland and Robinson (2000) make the stronger claim that a small decrease in child labor generates
a Pareto improvement as it increases children￿ s lifetime utility while maintaining parents￿lifetime utility.
This is not true in this case because the Nash-Cournot equilibrium maximizes parents￿ utility and any
movement away from this equilibrium makes parents worse o⁄.
8parent is to increase transfers to children. By inducing an increase in parental transfers,
the forced decrease in child labor moves the economy closer to the social optimal generating
aggregate welfare gains. The child is made better o⁄because she receives more transfers and
works less. The parent is made worse o⁄because of the decrease in consumption and leisure
implied by the increase in parental transfers; however, the raise in her child￿ s life-time utility
o⁄-sets this e⁄ect.
Proposition 1 shows that a small reduction on child labor increases children￿ s lifetime
utility and the average level of welfare and suggests that the imposition of a ban on child
labor can move the economy closer to the social optimal by inducing an increase in parental
transfers. We can therefore postulate that a ban on child labor can be welfare improving.
This simple model allows us to underline an e⁄ect of restrictions to child labor that have
been ignored in the literature. From the analysis, it is evident that the question concerning
the e⁄ects of this constraint is whether a restriction on child labor places the economy closer
to the optimum, enhancing welfare, or farther away beyond it, decreasing welfare.
Moreover, constraints on child labor might have important implications to the accumu-
lation of human capital. If, in the one hand, a decrease in child labor reduces the resources
available to ￿nance education, on the other hand, it increases the time available to educa-
tion with an overall ambiguous impact on the accumulation of human capital. The e⁄ect of
restrictions on the ability of children to work on the accumulation of human capital can be
crucial, for instance, in determining their long-run e⁄ects as it a⁄ects future parents￿wealth
and hence future parental transfers. Given the potential importance of the impact of child
labor on human capital accumulation, I develop a realistic economic environment where I
allow for the endogenous accumulation of human and physical capital and where prices are
￿ exible.
93 The Economic Environment
I study an economy where a large number of identical agents are born in each period and
live for T periods, ￿rst as children then as adults. Individuals in each generation maximize




i￿1u(ci;t+i￿1;li;t+i￿1) + ￿ ￿a f V1;t+1; (12)
where ￿ > 0 is the subjective discount factor, ci;t is consumption and li;t is leisure of an age￿i
individual in period t. Each agent is assumed to have f children in the second period of her
life and ￿a 2 [0;1=(￿ f)) is the altruism discount factor, the factor at which she discounts
her child￿ s lifetime utility. A parent values her children￿ s consumption and leisure because
she cares for their well-being. Furthermore, children have the same preferences as adults
over own consumption and leisure. The ￿momentary￿utility function takes the constant









where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of consumption on the
Cobb-Douglas index.
As the exogenous fertility rate is f; a younger generation is f times bigger than the
preceding one. The share of age ￿ i individuals in the population, given by the measure ￿i,
i = 1;2;::;T; is constant over time and ￿i+1 = ￿i=f; with
PT
i=1 ￿i = 1.
Individuals have one unit of time each period. In the ￿rst period of their lives, they can
choose how much time they allocate to leisure, education, and work. Agents can work during
any period of their lives, unless a ban on child labor is in place in which case they can only
work when adults, ages two to T. They supply hi;t hours of labor and earn wt hi;tsi;t where
wt and si;t are the real hourly wage rate per unit of human capital and age ￿ i agent￿ s level
10of human capital in period t, respectively.
The budget constraint facing an individual of age i at time t can be written as
ai+1;t+1 = (1 + rt)ai;t ￿ gi;t + gi+1;t=f + wt hi;tsi;t ￿ ci;t ￿ ei;t; (14)
where ai;t denotes the beginning-of-period asset holdings of an age￿i individual at time t, and
rt denotes the rate of return on these assets. The variable ei;t describes private investment
in education. Finally, gi;t represents the resources given by a parent to her children while
gi+1;t=f are the resources received by age ￿ i agent from her age ￿ (i + 1) parent. For
simplicity, I allow these transfers from parents to occur only twice during their lifetime, in
the second period of parents￿lives, when their o⁄spring are children, and in the last period
of parents￿lives.
I assume that children cannot borrow against their future income:
a2;t ￿ 0; 8t: (15)
I make this assumption because it is a more realistic representation of the actual economic
environment. It is important to observe that, as in Soares (2008), in this model economy
a constraint to children￿ s ability to borrow increases welfare and thus does not generate
ine¢ cient levels of child labor.
In regards to the strategic behavior of agents in the game played between parents and
their children, I assume that parents and children are Cournot players and analyze Nash-
Cournot equilibria.4 Hence, I assume away equilibria where children have an active role
in the bargaining process. This is a common assumption in the literature and is also the
most realistic one when dealing with the relationship between parents and underage chil-
dren: children have no bargaining power and parents usually make most decisions for their
4Recall that, as shown in O￿ Connel and Zeldes (1993), as long as we assume that the o⁄spring are Cournot
players the equilibrium is the same whether we assume that parents are Cournot players, Stackelberg leaders,
or make all decisions in behalf of their children.
11children.5
Gifts from age ￿ T parents to their o⁄spring, gT;t cannot be negative, but I allow the
gifts from age ￿ 2 parents to children, g2;t to be negative. That is, age ￿ 2 parents can
make children transfer resources to them. In this environment, this is equivalent to letting
parents manage all the family￿ s resources whether they are brought home by them or by
their children.
Children are born with a given level of skills, s1;t, and can accumulate human capital by
going to school. The level of human capital accumulated by each child increases with the
time allocated to learning, d1;t; and the level of physical resources invested in education, e1;t.






where the parameters ￿d and ￿e are respectively the coe¢ cients of time and physical resources
in the learning technology while ￿ is the total factor productivity of the education process.
Adults cannot accumulate human capital and their skill level evolves according to
si+1;t+1 = si;t 8i = 2;:::;T:
Hence this model incorporates the ￿ndings of Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1997) that
show that child labor might not be detrimental to education. In e⁄ect, all else constant,
children that can work are able to supplement the resources they receive from their parents
and assign more resources to education than if they were not allowed to work. So on the
one hand, child labor might hinder the education of children by decreasing the amount of
time they have available for education. On the other hand, child labor might help children
accumulate human capital by increasing the resources that they can devote to education.
5I abstract from the possibility of strategic behavior between adult children and their parents to focus on
the role of the relationship between adult parents and their underage children.
12The time constraint facing an individual of age i at time t is
hi;t + li;t + di;t = 1







where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the labor share of output, and Yt; Kt, and Lt are the levels of output,
capital input and e⁄ective labor input, respectively.
The capital stock is equal to the aggregate asset holdings of individuals in the economy.
It depreciates at a constant rate ￿ and evolves according to the law of motion,
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It: (18)
The e⁄ective labor input is given by the number of hours worked by agents in the economy




￿i;t si;t hi;t, (19)
where Nt is the population size in period t.
Competitive ￿rms maximize pro￿ts, equal to Yt￿￿Kt￿wtLt￿rtKt, taking the wage, wt,
and the interest rate, rt, as given. The ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rm￿ s problem determine
the following functions for the net real return to capital and the real wage rate:






To solve the model numerically, I assign values to the parameters of preferences and tech-
nologies. I calibrate the model parameters so that the steady-state of the economy matches
observations for selected variables in the U.S. economy around 1870-80, when child labor
laws had not yet been adopted and there were signi￿cant levels of child labor. The calibra-
tion is mostly based on observations for the period in question. For some parameter values,
I have not found any sources for the 1870￿ s, and I use common parametrizations from the
macroeconomics literature.
Assuming that the model period is 10 years long, agents in this economy live for ￿ve
periods. They are born, i.e., become economically active, at the age of 5 and full-time
workers at age 15, working 40 years more to a total real-life age of 55. Although the life-
expectation at birth in 1870 was about 45 years, at age 20 it was around 42 more years (see
Pope, 2003), so I target a reasonable intermediate value.
Fertility Rate
The exogenous fertility rate is calibrated so that the population growth rate for the model
will match the average population annual growth rate in the US economy around 1860-90,
2:34% (US Department of Commerce). For the ￿ve generation model, this translates to a
fertility rate of f = 1:2602.
Preferences
I choose the values for the discount factor, ￿, to be 0:81 so that the annual risk free real
interest rate in steady-state is approximately 7:78%; the average ex-post real interest rate for
the period 1870-1893 computed by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) using Commercial paper
rates data from Homer and Sylla (1991) and implicit price de￿ ator for GNP data from Berry
(1988). I set the coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function, ￿; equal to 0:44 so that,
on average, adult agents allocate 33% of their available time to work, corresponding to about
1600 hours a year and assuming a net time endowment of 94 hours per week (see Ramey and
14Francis, 2005). I set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ equal to the standard value, 2:
Altruism
The altruism discount factor is chosen to match the average ratio of spending on education
per child to GDP per capita in the US economy, as in Krueger and Donahue (2005). A year of
education per child cost in current dollars $15:55 in 1870 and $12:71 in 1880 (US Department
of Education, 1997) while the ratio of kindergarten to grade 12 enrollment to 5- to 17- year
old children for those years was respectively, 57:04 and 65:54 (see Goldin, 1999). The average
level of GDP per capita in current dollars was $187:50 between 1869 and 1888 ($170 in 1870)
(US Department of Commerce). Thus, I choose the altruism discount factor to obtain a
ratio of spending on education per child to GDP per capita of 4:6%.
Production Technology
The share of capital in the production function is set to 0:34, the capital share of income
reported by Williamson and Lindert (1980) for the US in 1871. The depreciation rate is 3%
on an annual basis (see Williamson, 1974).
Education Technology
I set the coe¢ cient of expenditures on education in the education production function,
￿e, to 0:2, as in Fernandez and Rogerson (1994). I set the total factor productivity in the
education sector, ￿, to 10 and calibrate the coe¢ cient of time allocated to education in
the education production function, ￿d, to match the average percentage of available time
dedicated to education.6 According to Goldin (1999) between 1869 and 1900 children attend
school for 60 days per year on average. Assuming that they spend on average 6 hours at
school per attendance, the average percentage of time available allocated to education is
about 7:36%.
6With an appropriate adjustment of s1;t, total factor productivity in the education technology only has
a scale e⁄ect on most variables; it does not a⁄ect the time allocations or factor prices and impacts on the
absolute levels of all other variables by a factor of ￿
1
1￿￿e . I set its value to 10 for computational reasons.
15Finally, the level of children￿ s skills, s1;t; is set to match the amount of time children
allocate to work. Carter and Sutch (1996) report a labor force participation rate for boys in
1880 of 32% and of 12% for girls which corresponds to an average participation rate of about
22%. If we assume that children that work work on average 10 hours per day, the average
time children spend working is of about 20:80% of their available time.
The parameter choices for the benchmark model are summarized in Table 1.7
5 Findings
5.1 Impact of a ban on child labor
I study the welfare impact of an e⁄ective ban on child labor in an economy where children
cannot borrow against future income to ￿nance their consumption or education. I investigate
the introduction of a ban on child labor in this environment because it is representative of
the actual economic environment in the U.S. economy around 1870-80.
I ￿rst shut down the general equilibrium e⁄ects of the ban on child labor and look at a
partial equilibrium where I maintain the factor prices constant; I set the wage and interest
rate to their equilibrium levels in the steady-state of the economy where children can work.
This allows me to analyze the impact of the ban on child labor while abstracting from its
pecuniary externalities. I then take into account the pecuniary e⁄ect of the ban on child
labor on individuals￿welfare by looking at the general equilibrium where factor prices are
endogenous.
5.1.1 Steady-States
The steady-state results are presented in Table 2. In the ￿rst column, I summarize the results
for the economy with child labor. In the second column, I present the partial equilibrium
7The equilibria are found by solving for the optimality ￿rst order conditions and the market equilibrium
conditions using a standard non linear equation solver. An Appendix describing details of the computational
procedure is available on request.
16results for the economy where children cannot work, and, in the last column, I present the
general equilibrium results.
I ￿nd that agents are better o⁄ in the steady-states where children are not allowed to
work. The ban on child labor eliminates income that children would allocate to education
and consumption and generates an increase in the level of transfers they receive from parents.
A ban on child labor increases children￿ s leisure and reduces their consumption, raising
their marginal utility of consumption. The optimal response for a parent is to increase
transfers to children. So, by inducing an increase in parental transfers, the forced decrease
in child labor moves the economy closer to the social optimal generating aggregate welfare
gains. That is, a ban on child labor places children at a point of their parent￿ s reaction
function that corresponds to a higher level of parental transfers, bringing them closer to
their optimal level.
I measure the welfare bene￿t of an agent in the economy where child labor is not allowed
as the ￿xed percentage increase in the lifetime consumption of an individual of the same age
and her descendents in the steady-state of the economy with child labor needed to equate
the level of welfare of both individuals. This measure, which I refer to as the compensating
variation, is positive (negative) if there is a welfare gain (loss) relatively to the steady-state
with child labor.
In partial equilibrium, the ban leads to a decrease in children￿ s consumption, but invest-
ment in education increases. As children have more time to allocate to education, the return
to human capital accumulation is higher. Consequently, more of the parental transfers are
allocated to education. Because the level of skills increases, parents￿labor income increases
which bolsters the increase in parental transfers. As a result, in the long-run, the rise in
parental transfers is higher than the decrease in children￿ s labor income allowing for a signif-
icant increase in education spending. This e⁄ect underlines the importance of accounting for
the human capital accumulation when evaluating the impact of a ban on child labor. There
is a signi￿cant decrease in savings; in order to increase transfers, parents save less for future
17consumption.
Although, given the level of parental transfers, children would like to work, they are
better o⁄ in the steady-state where they are not allowed to work. Consumption would have
to increase by about 3.24% in every period for a newly born agent to be as well o⁄ in the
steady-state with child labor as in the steady-state where child labor is not allowed.
In general equilibrium, the decrease in aggregate savings generates a fall in capital that
together with the increase in human capital results in a decrease in wages, an increase in
interest rates, and a drop in income. The decline in the wage rate dampens down the
accumulation of human capital, because the return to education is lower, and parents￿with
a lower income transfer fewer resources to their children. As there is a signi￿cant decrease
in wealth relative to the partial equilibrium, leisure and consumption also decrease for most
generations, and the rise in welfare is much lower than when factor prices remain constant.
Consumption would have to increase by about 1.5% in every period for a newly born agent
to be as well o⁄ in the steady-state with child labor as in the steady-state where child labor
is not allowed.
Notice that income decreases with the ban on child labor. In partial equilibrium, human
capital increases with the ban on child labor, and this results in an increase in the e⁄ective
wage rate, and the adult labor supply increases. However, savings decrease as parents choose
to allocate more resources to their children and less to their future consumption, and capital
income decreases. The latter e⁄ect is stronger, and income decreases. In general equilibrium,
the response of factor prices leads to a lower increase in human capital and in the e⁄ective
labor supply in the long-run, and income decreases by even more. So, for the benchmark
calibration, the ban on child labor increases average welfare but decreases per capita income.
5.1.2 Transition Paths
To analyze the short-run impact of the ban on child labor on welfare, I look at the transition
from the steady-state of the economy with child labor to the steady-states of the economy
18where children cannot work. Again, I focus ￿rst on the partial equilibrium transition where
I keep the factor prices constant, and then I analyze the general equilibrium transition where
factor prices are endogenous.
Partial Equilibrium: It is clear that altruism plays a central role; as we observe in Figure
1 Panel d, when the ban on child labor is implemented, the transfers from parents increase
signi￿cantly. Parents care about the lifetime utility of their children, and when children
can no longer work to ￿nance consumption and education, they give them more resources.
Because children have more time to allocate to education, the return to the investment in
human capital accumulation rises sharply. Therefore, the resources allocated to education
jump to close to their new steady-state values, (Figure 1 Panels e and f), drastically above
their initial levels. Some of the additional parental transfers are allocated by children to
consumption which decreases only slightly (Figure 1 Panel a).
Future adult generations work more to take advantage of their increased skills. As future
parents generate a higher labor income they transfer more resources to their children which
helps sustain the increase in human capital.
Children￿ s lifetime utility increases as we can see in Figure 2 Panel a. This increase in
welfare is related to the surge in children￿ s leisure (Figure 1 Panel b), as the initial period￿ s
children no longer work, although they allocate much more time to education and in their
future consumption as adults.
These ￿ndings show that a ban on child labor can make children better o⁄ by inducing
an increase in parental transfers. More importantly, in Figure 2 Panel f, it is clear that the
average lifetime utility of agents increases immediately in response to the ban on child labor.
As both average welfare and the lifetime utility of children are higher in every period
after the implementation of the ban on child labor, we can infer that any measure of welfare










is also higher than in the equilibrium where children can work. Hence the ban on child labor
generates an increase in welfare for any welfare function of this form.
Notice also that in the period where the ban on child labor starts, parents￿ welfare
only decreases slightly (see Figure 2 Panel b). Parents want to increase the resources they
transfer to their children. In order to do so they increase the time allocated to work (see
Figure 1 Panel c) and reduce current and future consumption (see Figure 1 Panel a). So,
the increase in transfers comes at the cost of lower consumption and leisure levels for the
remaining of their lives. This implies that the non-altruistic utility of the initial period￿ s
parents decreases (see Figure 3 Panel b). However, the signi￿cant rise in children￿ s lifetime
utility increases parents￿lifetime utility for altruistic reasons almost o⁄-setting the previous
e⁄ect. Nonetheless, a parent is made worse o⁄ with the ban and will want to send her
children to work; a ban on child labor would need to be enforced taking these incentives into
account.
As can be seen in Figure 4, initially, as adults save less to transfer more resources to their
children upon the imposition of the ban on child labor, the accumulation of assets decreases
drastically. In contrast, human capital increases very signi￿cantly because of the increase in
resources allocated to education. We also observe an initial decrease in the e⁄ective labor
supply as a direct result of the ban on child labor. However, the increase in human capital
and in adult labor supply generates a subsequent raise in the e⁄ective labor supply.
General Equilibrium: In general equilibrium, the initial decrease in labor supply results
in a large increase in wages (￿gure 5 Panels c an d). Then, as physical capital decreases and
the e⁄ective labor supply increases with human capital, the wage rate falls. The response of
the wage rate implies a decline both in the return to education and in parents￿labor income
20generating a decrease in the funds that are channeled to education (￿gure 6 panels e and f),
and we observe a signi￿cant dampening down of the investment in education relative to the
partial equilibrium path. As a result, initially, human capital rises much less than in partial
equilibrium and converges to considerably lower levels afterward. Even though there is an
increase in interest rate, in the long-run physical capital decreases by more, which keeps
wages down and contains the increase in human capital.
While children￿ s and the average levels of welfare still increase, they are lower than in
partial equilibrium (see ￿gure 7 Panels a and f). So the general equilibrium e⁄ects diminish
the positive impact of the ban on child labor on welfare.
Note that in both cases, although the ban on child labor increases average welfare, it
has a negative impact on some agents￿utility. It is therefore not a pareto improvement.
Moreover, a ban on child labor decreases the well-being of the initial adults and children do
not vote, thus it would not be implemented as a result of a democratic process where adult
agents vote for or against the adoption of the ban.8
5.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform some sensitivity analysis with respect to several important pa-
rameters of the economic environment. In these experiments, I change the value of the
corresponding parameter while maintaining all the other parameters constant; that is, I do
not re-calibrate the remaining parameters using the procedure described in Section 4. Table
3 shows the sensitivity of the welfare measures and of the equilibrium levels of some key
variables to substantial variations in the altruism discount factor, the coe¢ cient of time in
the education process, and the coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function.
As the altruism discount factor decreases parents care less about their children￿ s well-
being, and they are more willing to send them to work in order to supplement the family￿ s
8Although the objective of this paper is to evaluate the welfare implications of a ban on child labor, it
would be interesting to build on this economic environment to develop a positive theory of the emergence
of a ban on child labor which would hinge on the impact of this policy on human capital accumulation and
would contrast with the rational presented in Doepke and Zillibotti (2005).
21income. When ￿a = 0:15 parents make children allocate approximately 60% of their time
to work and use children￿ s labor income to ￿nance their own consumption. The ban on child
labor eliminates children￿ s only source of income; parents are then willing to use their own
income to ￿nance their children￿ s education and consumption. Although the qualitative re-
sponse of the variables is similar to what we saw in the benchmark economy, the quantitative
impact on welfare is much more signi￿cant. Consumption would have to increase by between
around 15% to 25% in every period for a child to be as well o⁄in the steady-state with child
labor as in an equilibrium where child labor is not allowed.
When the coe¢ cient associated with the amount of time allocated to education in the
human capital production function is increased to ￿d = 0:2, the ban on child labor generates
a long-run increase in income, in contrast to what we observed in the benchmark calibration.
A ban on child labor allows children to allocate more time to the accumulation of human
capital and to leisure. As time is more productive in the education process, the increase
in time allocated to education has a much stronger impact on human capital accumulation.
The resulting increase in the e⁄ective labor supply outweighs the decrease in savings leading
to an increase in income. In general equilibrium, the impact on factor prices leads to a lower
increase in human capital, and there is a lesser increase in income. So, in this case, the ban
on child labor increases average welfare and per capita income.
When the coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function, ￿, is one and the coe¢ cient
associated with the amount of time allocated to education in the human capital production
function, ￿d, is zero, there is no cost of opportunity for children to allocate time to work.
Under these conditions, a ban on child labor has a negative impact on children￿ s welfare as
a costless source of income would be taken away from them.
Although the benchmark level of parameter ￿d is very low, we have to increase the
coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function to about 0:6 for a ban on child labor to
have a negative impact on the initial level of average welfare. But even then the ban on child
labor still increases current children and future agents￿well-being. There are two important
22factors that are a⁄ected by this parameter. On the one hand, a high ￿ implies a large amount
of labor supplied by children; when ￿ = 0:6; 40% of children￿ s time is allocated to work while
12% is allocated to education. This means that a ban on child labor has a bigger impact
on children￿ s labor supply and income. On the other hand, agents do not care as much
about leisure, so the release of time from child labor has little direct impact on utility, while
its impact on human capital accumulation is limited by the low coe¢ cient of time and the
diminishing returns in the education process. Therefore, the opportunity cost of children￿ s
labor is diminished by the decreased weight of leisure in the utility function and the low
impact of time on the human capital accumulation process, while the negative impact of
the ban increases with the amount of labor supplied by children. The response of parental
transfers is still signi￿cant and o⁄sets the net negative impact of the ban on child labor on
children￿ s well-being. But the reduced increase in children￿ s utility, due to the lower cost of
opportunity of child labor, is not enough to induce an increase in the initial average level of
welfare.
6 Final Comments
In this paper, I showed that a ban on child labor can be desirable as it increases the average
level of welfare as well as children￿ s welfare, and advanced a new rationale for imposing
restrictions on child labor. In an overlapping generations model with altruism, the level of
parental transfers that maximizes average welfare is higher than the level that is optimal
for parents in an economy where children can work. By reducing the income earned by
children, a ban on child labor leads parents to increase transfers to children, moving the
economy closer to the social optimum and generating aggregate welfare gains. Children are
made better o⁄ because they receive more transfers and do not have to work; they move
closer to the levels of parental transfers and leisure that maximize their welfare. Parents are
made worse o⁄because of the decrease in consumption and leisure implied by the increase in
23parental transfers; however, the raise in their children￿ s life-time utility partially o⁄-sets this
e⁄ect. The average level of welfare also increases because more weight is given to children￿ s
well-being than to their parents￿well-being as it enters average welfare directly and through
their parents￿lifetime utility.
This paper stresses the importance of considering explicitly the impact of a ban on child
labor on children￿ s well-being and of accounting for its general equilibrium e⁄ects. But, while
it introduces a new rational for impeding child labor, the present framework abstracts from
several features that are potentially interesting.
Firstly, the model does not allow for human capital externalities. A ban on child labor
generates a strong increase in the long-run level of human capital. In the presence of an
economy-wide human capital externality, the impact of the ban would be ampli￿ed, and the
welfare gains would be signi￿cantly higher. Furthermore, the short-run impact on wages and
interest rates might be such that a majority of older generations supports its implementation.
Secondly, having endogenized child labor and human capital education, it is then natural
to also include harmful forms of child labor by allowing for endogenous changes in health.
However, the qualitative results of a ban child labor in that case should not di⁄er from the
ones in this paper which are driven mostly by the nature of the game played between parents
and their children.
Finally, the investigation in this paper focuses on extreme cases, namely children are
allowed to work as much as they want or not at all. In practice, it is very costly for govern-
ments to ban child labor. Hence, developing alternative policies that can increase welfare and
reduce the incidence of child labor in environments where a ban on child labor is infeasible
would represent a signi￿cant step towards practical policy analysis. Moreover, like with most
arguments for a ban on child labor, the one provided in this paper means that a constraint
on child labor is at most a second-best solution and not an optimal policy. Although the
￿rst-best is not achievable through purely redistributive policies in an unconstrained econ-
omy, as changes in parental transfers would o⁄set those policies, because there are binding
24constraints on children￿ s borrowing, an appropriately designed transfer policy might place
the economy closer to the social optimum.
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287 Tables and Figures
Table 1 - Calibration
T f ￿ ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿ ￿e ￿d ￿ ￿ s1;t
5 1:2602 :87 2 :44 :44 10 0:2 0:068 0:66 0:2626 1:4
Table 2
Impact of a Ban on Child Labor
Economy  Economy
with Child Labor with Ban on Child Labor
Partial Eq. General Eq.
Skills 5.5874 5.8101 5.7543
Labor
Age-1 0.2099 0.0000 0.0000
Age-2 0.6121 0.6238 0.6260
Age-3 0.4713 0.4873 0.4836
Age-4 0.2793 0.3011 0.2871
Age-5 0.0177 0.0474 0.0157
Assets
Age-2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age-3 0.2033 0.1608 0.1678
Age-4 0.5336 0.4995 0.5076
Age-5 0.6286 0.6077 0.6214
Consumption
Age-1 0.2443 0.2238 0.2154
Age-2 0.5425 0.5471 0.5281
Age-3 0.7395 0.7457 0.7290
Age-4 1.0079 1.0164 1.0065
Age-5 1.3739 1.3854 1.3896
Leisure
Age-1 0.6970 0.8650 0.8659
Age-2 0.3879 0.3762 0.3740
Age-3 0.5287 0.5127 0.5164
Age-4 0.7207 0.6989 0.7129
Age-5 0.9823 0.9526 0.9843
Parental Transfers (received) 0.2727 0.3546 0.3403
Education Time 0.0931 0.1350 0.1341
Private Funding of Education 0.1221 0.1308 0.1249
Interest  rate 1.1355 1.1355 1.1909
Wage rate 0.3186 0.3186 0.3123
Income (NNP) 0.7466 0.7439 0.7320
Welfare  Level of Age-1 Agent -13.0171 -12.7868 -12.9093
Compensating Variation 3.2384% 1.4963%
29Table 3
Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of a Ban on Child Labor
Unconstrained
Economy
First Period Steady-State First Period Steady-state
Skill accumulation 3.8193 4.2943 4.4958 4.2906 4.3181
Child labor 0.5983 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Parental Transfers (received) -0.1230 0.1277 0.1525 0.1276 0.1291
Income (GNP) 0.6097 0.5338 0.6115 0.5541 0.5696
Lifetime utility - Age-1 agent -9.9224 -9.0891 -8.7836 -9.0962 -9.1877
Comp. Var. - Age-1 agent 16.9576% 24.3211% 16.7967% 14.7264%
Skill accumulation 4.7439 4.9835 5.0885 4.9819 5.0386
Child labor 0.1550 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Parental Transfers (received) 0.2472 0.2977 0.3217 0.2973 0.3092
Income (GNP) 0.6282 0.6113 0.6490 0.6161 0.6387
Lifetime utility - Age-1 agent -14.3914 -14.1821 -14.0521 -14.2171 -14.1838
Comp. Var. - Age-1 agent 2.6500% 4.3523% 2.1991% 2.6286%
Skill accumulation 5.8370 6.0980 6.2158 6.1363 6.1712
Child labor 0.4002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Parental Transfers (received) 0.3264 0.4262 0.4573 0.4312 0.4980
Income (GNP) 1.0362 0.9947 1.0232 1.0015 1.0417
Lifetime utility - Age-1 agent -12.8760 -12.7746 -12.6096 -12.8062 -12.4378




Partial Eq. General Eq.
βa = 0.15
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31Figure 2: Ban on Child Labor - Welfare Levels along Partial Equilibrium Path
32Figure 3: Ban on Child Labor - "Sel￿sh" Welfare Levels along Partial Equilibrium Path
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